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Industrial Relations in Scandinavia 
Gil Schonning 
The author enumerates the characteristics of the Scandina-
vian system of industrial relations, notes ten most signifi-
cant one and compares their system with the one prevailing 
in Canada. 
There is increasing évidence that countries that are committed to 
spécifie goals of rapid growth, full employment, price stability, etc. must 
also commit themselves to more économie management, especially to 
keeping priées compétitive which, in turn, forces thèse countries to give 
more attention to the functioning of their industrial relations Systems. 
An industrial relations system defined along the lines provided by 
the Task Force on Canadian Industrial Relations is inherently unstable 
whether the nexus of relations is governed by law and supported by 
traditional social norms, or, by and large, the latter alone. 
While large économie benefits can and do accrue from most indus-
trial relations Systems, ail or part of thèse benefits can, from time to time, 
be wiped out when industrial relations become particularly unstable. This 
can happen in a number of ways, such as through strikes, go slow, 
work-to-rule and/or an increased amount of absenteeism caused by lack 
of motivation, and the often significant indirect effect of thèse actions. 
With increasing international trade specialization, a disturbance in one 
country can affect production em-
ployment and priées in another 
country, which may produce various 
other undesirable effects. Possibly 
even more important, the key groups 
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in industrial relations might produce collective bargaining results that 
are inappropriate to the économie situation in a given period. Evidence 
suggests, although not clearly, that sometimes the share from total income 
going to wages and salaries may be too small. This is usually followed by 
extended periods when rising priées and incomes expectations lead to 
undesirable results, including the need for government restraints, accomp-
anied by higher unemployment. 
In view of the inhérent potentials in an industrial relations system 
for creating benefits (via increased productivity), as well as for creating 
periods of high cost from industrial relations disturbances, it would appear 
worth our while to examine what makes some Systems more stable than 
others, what créâtes disturbances and what sort of encouragement, ser-
vices or other devices might be used to minimize thèse disturbances. 
It is with the operating part of the industrial relations system that 
we are particularly interested — the worker-union-management — owner 
relationships. Thèse relations are, of course, influenced by a highly com-
plex set of factors, but basically they receive their characteristics from a 
set of social norms held by the population which produces the « climate » 
for industrial relations, and, consequently, the attitude and behaviour of 
the key parties in the system. Thèse social norms, while not immutable, 
can be pretty strongly held, as witness the récent tussle in the United 
Kingdom when the trade union won a victory over the Government on 
the pénal issues. 
It is said that a rich country such as Canada is more capable of 
absorbing the cost of industrial relations disturbances than, say, a devel-
oping country, especially one with one or two industries only. Or, it is 
said that our system is less costly than the Italian one. Both examples 
are rather irrelevant. Any system can be improved upon but those who 
hâve achieved this hâve done so by working hard at it by, first and 
foremost, producing a favourable industrial relations climate ; by increas-
ing éducation about what the industrial relations system can yield, by 
clarifying the rôles each of the two key parties can play and by finding 
common grounds for removing or minimizing the factors causing insta-
bility in the system. Obviously, no industrial relations system can be 
wholly stable where économie motivation is high, consumer demand in-
satiable and where output must be rationed. But évidence suggests that 
the intensity of the conflict within the system can be reduced with positive 
effort. 
214 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 25, NO 2 
One way of discovering ideas for improving our own system of 
industrial relations is to examine what inputs were made by another 
country which has achieved a greater measure of industrial stability. 
Précise institutions, machinery or procédures in one country are not 
readily adaptable in another, but principles and ideas often are. With this 
in mind, we might explore what factors and efforts hâve gone into 
making the Scandinavian industrial relations system less unstable than ours. 
It is not too surprising in view of the expanding amount of commu-
nication among the four Nordic countries, especially at the officiai levels, 
that thèse hâve developed quite similar industrial relations Systems. Their 
objectives are much the same and the means used to achieve thèse ob-
jectives hâve followed similar Unes. On the scale of sophistication, Sweden 
has arrived at a higher level than the others, but each has been frequently 
using ideas and techniques from the others and ail hâve gained a measure 
of stability and rationality in their Systems that is worth looking at. 
What is the secret of their achievement ? Homogeneity in three of 
the four may, in part, account for the similar development ; they may be 
said to hâve similar social norms, but Finland is différent in many res-
pects. It has, nevertheless, modelled its system on the others, especially 
on Sweden and with growing success. 
It is, of course, difficult to identify precisely ail the factors and 
deliberate efforts that hâve shaped their industrial relations Systems, but 
the essential ones do émerge, both from documentation and from Per-
sonal contacts. We can only draw to the attention of the reader some 
of the more basic éléments that hâve gone into changing the Scandinavian 
industrial relations system from being pretty unstable to becoming rela-
tively stable. 
AU four countries trace the beginning of their trade union move-
ments to the 19th century and Uke many such movements dating from 
that period, they experienced a great deal of opposition and contributed 
to a somewhat turbulent type of industrial relations. The history of the 
period up to World War II is well documented. AU we need to recaU 
is that for the most part of the period the union-employer relations were, 
by and large, decentralized and strained and collective bargaining rested 
principally on power generaUy unfettered by knowledge. The climate 
for trade union development was not wholly négative but neither was 
it positive. It was essentially a period in which the « free-for-all > prevailed, 
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resulting ki the strong gaining advantages over the weak. Being a « free-
for-all » meant that the parties pursued short-term objectives rather than 
long-term gains. 
Gradually and in succession, the labour market parties in thèse 
countries came to the conclusion that the existing System was not only 
wasteful and costly but exhibited tendencies alien to a maturing demo-
cracy. Possibly equally pervasive was the fear by both that in the absence 
of a more rational approach the State might intervene, something neither 
party wanted. 
Usually after a protracted period of negotiations between the parties 
a Basic Agreement was drawn up and signed. The Agreement spells out 
a code of conduct and includes certain rights and obligations. In agreeing 
to the terms of the Agreement (not binding in law) both parties, but 
especially the trade unions, gave up some of their earlier freedom of 
action in return for greater stability and, hopefully, greater longer-term 
gains. The document marked a turning point in the trade unions' attitudes 
to industry and employers' attitudes to trade unions, both indicating an 
extended sensé of responsibility to society generally. 
Many disagreed with the terms of the Basic Agreement and consi-
dered it a sell-out, in that it put trade unions and employers in a strait-
jacket. The opposition to the Agreement has dwindled with time, in part 
because the leadership of both sides hâve worked diligently in making 
the more self-regulatory system work. Forming trade unions and shaping 
new relationships became easier because of the effort on ail sides to 
improve the climate in which trade unions and collective bargaining could 
develop. 
The trade union in thèse countries is now regarded by the public 
as a responsible and mature institution forming an intégral part of the 
démocratie fabric of each. Many factors hâve accounted for this. We 
shall limit thèse to what are believed to be the principal ones. Both sides 
agrée to follow a positive policy of removing causes of unnecessary 
conflicts and to recognize and respect each other's rôles, but not dogma-
tically. Secondly, a major share of the locus of decision-making was 
shifted to the central level which included not only responsibilities for 
bargaining about the share of aggregate income that should go to labour, 
but also responsibility for keeping unruly éléments in check. Thirdly, 
the strict observation of the peace obligations was laid down in the Basic 
216 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 2 5 , NO 2 
Agreement. Fourthly, the development of a full employment policy in 
each country which when strongly pursued tends, in part, to détermine the 
behaviour of both labour market parties as well as the Government. 
Lastly, and possibly the most pervasive, has been the exceptionally strong 
emphasis given to éducation and training by both parties. Possibly nowhere 
in the Western world do trade unions spend as much per capita on their 
own éducation development as in thèse countries. (Finland has tended 
to lag somewhat in this and other respects, in part because of the trou-
blesome political division within the trade union movement). Trade union 
training and éducation in thèse countries emphasizes not only such 
essential matters as running an efficient union, training of shop stewards 
and expanding trade union policies, but also such matters as the opération 
of the economy and reasons for Government policies. 
It has been asserted that a principal reason for the improvement 
in the stability of industrial relations in thèse countries stems from the 
trade unionists having had a party of their own choice in power over 
much of their récent history. It is claimed that this party pursued social 
and économie policies which were favourable to trade unions. There is 
much in this argument but it ought not to be exaggerated at the expense 
of the many positive programmes carried out by the labour market 
parties themselves. There had to be a high degree of consensus about 
government policies by both parties. 
As in ail Western countries, apart from Germany, which hâve had 
a long trade union tradition, unions formed along craft or spécial interest 
group lines. The picture even now is one of too many unions, despite 
the trend towards amalgamation. The development went quite early towards 
national unions who, in turn, banded themselves together into a central 
structure called the L.O. Most of the salaried worker's unions, a more 
récent development, hâve found it to their advantage to hâve separate 
central bodies. Similarly, the employers organized themselves into indus-
trial groups followed by the formation of confédérations of thèse. 
Collective bargaining was, for a long time, a local matter. However, 
the Basic Agreement provided that the central bodies should carry out 
the first stage in the negotiations. That is, the Central Trade Union Orga-
nization and the Confédération of Employers hâve become the bargain-
ing agent for ail workers and employers belonging to thèse organizations. 
As such, they are charged with the responsibility of obtaining results 
sufficiently acceptable to the national groups (sometimes a rather difficult 
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task) which will avoid strike action and also be conducive to maintenance 
of full employment, stable priées, etc. This is a pretty considérable 
objective. Briefly, the procédure adopted prior to the central negotiations 
is to allow local demand to flow upward and then to be sifted at two 
or three différent levels before reaching the bargaining agent. How much 
this information is used, very few know. The negotiators then attempt 
to hammer out what is termed an économie frame. This is done in the 
context of a great deal of agreed-upon information and free from the 
pressures of employers and trade unions being directiy involved. While 
the content of this frame may vary from time to time as to money wages, 
drift, fringes, emphasis on the lower-paid, etc., the outcome must on 
the one hand prevent undue disturbance among the workers and on the 
other hand through cost to the employers, prevent undue disturbance 
on priées and the labour market generally. 
When the frame has been arrived at, and this can take weeks or 
months depending on the différence in the attitude towards what the 
economy can afford and the amount of accumulated dissatisfaction at 
the grass-roots, the national organizations may accept or reject it. If 
accepted, negotiations continue between national unions and the National 
Industry Employers Association as to distribution of the resuit. Further 
negotiations usually take place also at the plant or establishment level. 
In other words, one might recognize three levels of negotiations under 
this system. 
An observation one might make about the strong attempt to avoid 
strikes is that when the grass-roots boys are particularly restless, sometimes 
for other than monetary reasons, central negotiations tend to be particul-
arly lengthy. This is probably a sort of trade-off to strike action. At home, 
such situations do frequently lead to strike in order, it is claimed, to 
allow the workers to blow off steam. 
What rôle does the government play in this System ? One sometimes 
gets the impression that the Labour Market parties are so mature and 
well-disciplined that they need no third party help. In many ways this 
is true because they hâve outgrown the need for certain props provided 
earlier. Ail the countries hâve, for exemple, a Collective Bargaining Act 
which dates back to the early part of the century. This législation provided 
or implied, among other things, the right of trade unions to organize. 
The iaw has now almost been forgotten because there is no longer any 
question about this right. 
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The State does provide for two important services which are es-
sential to the whole opération, the Labour Court and the State Médiation 
Service. Both of thèse institutions also date back a great many years. 
The Labour Court arbitrâtes grievances and the State Médiation Service 
assists the parties in achieving settlements without strike action. Before 
examining the rôles of thèse institutions let us examine the status of 
the collective agreement. The terms and conditions of an agreement, once 
signed, remain unaltered for an agreed-upon period. A peace obligation 
covers every agreement in Scandinavia ; in Finland and Sweden it is 
regulated by the Collective Agreements Act, in Norway by the Labour 
Disputes Act and in Denmark it is based on « customary rules ». This 
means, of course, that strikes, lockouts, or other offensive actions cons-
titute a violation of the Agreement. This statutory obligation refers to 
both trade unions and the individual worker in ail the countries except 
Finland — where the législation exempts the individual workers. (This 
makes wild-cat strikes possible). This mandatory rule supercedes any 
clause to the contrary that may be put in the Agreement. 
Employment relationships are also regulated either by law and/or 
the Basic Agreement. Among thèse are the questions of dismissals, lay-
offs and hiring. 
The Labour Court 
The need for différent machinery for dealing with « rights » and 
« interest » disputes was made early in Scandinavia. In cassation, Labour 
Courts were established in ail four countries (as early as 1915 in Norway). 
Thèse deal exclusively with rights disputes. The Court is an independent, 
triparti te body whose administrative cost is borne by the State. The size 
of the Court may vary from seven to nine. Ail are appointed by the 
State (technically by the Président in Finland and by the King in each 
of the other three). On nomination, two or three are appointed from the 
Employers Confédération and the same number from the Central Trade 
Union Organization. Two or three persons appointed, including the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman, must hâve légal training and judicial ex-
périence. 
The work of the Court is to judge cases covering interprétation and 
sometimes the validity of the Collective Agreement, or cases concerning 
prohibited offensive actions or acts against the laws of right of associa-
tion and bargaining. In ail thèse areas the Labour Court acts as a 
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Suprême Court. There is no appeal of its judgements. The establishment 
of only one Court in each country assumed that the vast majority of 
grievances between labour and management would be settled before 
reaching the Court. This was not so in earlier years. The high annual 
volume of cases confirmed that a large number of grievances reached 
the Court, but with growing maturity of the organizations and expérience 
gained from the judgments of the Court which established précédents, 
this volume has grown rather thin. The procédure of the Court follows 
that of ordinary courts, with a calling of witnesses and carefully prepared 
factual statements in writing supporting the judgement. Much care is 
taken to make both sides understand clearly the reasons for the judgement. 
So far, the Court has functioned successfully without the help of specialized 
labour lawyers. The vast majority of the judgements are unanimous. The 
results of the voting are made public. 
The suits in this Court are, as a rule, conducted by and against 
parties to collective agreements. This is true even where rights and duties 
of individual employers and workers are concerned. Judgements may 
call for compensation. In this respect, compensation given by this Court 
may differ from compensation given by an ordinary Court. In Norway 
and Sweden damages may be mitigated according to spécial rules, but 
in Denmark and Finland, damages are usually replaced by a compensatory 
fine not closely related to the actual loss. Both must be paid by the 
violator to the wronged party. It is not known what approach has been 
the most effective. Certainly the very heavy fines that can be levied on 
violator s of the Collective Agreement in Denmark and Finland appear 
to be conclusive deterrents. 
State Médiation Service 
While work stoppages are prohibited in cases of rights disputes, 
there is no such ban in cases of conflicts of interests. Législation appeared 
quite early which provided a service that would minimize strike action 
on interest issues. In three of the countries this service consists of one 
State Mediator plus an appropriate number of régional mediators. Den-
mark has used three State mediators plus a number of régional ones. 
For some time this service was crisis-related along the line of our own 
compulsory conciliation. The law provides that no strike action may take 
place before notice of such has been sent to the mediator. He would then 
perform the usual rôle of a mediator. 
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With time and expérience, this service has become more flexible. 
The responsibility of this service is not limited to the crisis period but 
also for identifying and resolving developing trouble spots at any time, 
Mediators may also enter the negotiations at an early stage — so-called 
on-going médiation. In some instances, use has been made of specially 
appointed mediators. In the last two central negotiations in Sweden a 
specially appointed Board was used to achieve settlements. 
Apart from the above measures designed to reduce and résolve 
conflict of interest and conflict of rights, three other deterrents corne to 
mind. The central System of negotiations impose a very great respon-
sibility on the members to find a solution, more so than in the case of 
a local negotiation. Secondly, any strike action contemplated by one 
member of the Central Confédération must first be sanctioned by that 
Confédération. Thirdly, there is always the sovereignty of the State. 
Evidence shows that in certain circumstances the State has from time 
to time intervened to protect the « public interest ». Only Sweden has 
so far escaped such intervention. 
Joint Consultation (Advisory Bodies) 
Improving relationships between workers and management at the 
place of work has received increasing attention in the postwar period. 
Joint consultation committees or work councils hâve been established 
for this purpose. Thèse are made up of elected représentatives of workers 
(with shop stewards being ex ojjicio members) and représentatives of 
management. The terms of référence of such a body are usually fairly 
wide. The agenda for discussion might include : promoting efficiency and 
quality of production ; rationalization and changes in the enterprise with 
joint assessment of technical, économie and human problems involved ; 
training programmes ; welfare ; information about the enterprise and 
future plans. 
As in Canada, the degree of success of thèse committees or councils 
varies widely, even though in Scandinavia they hâve been formally agreed 
to and given support and encouragement by the two central confédéra-
tions. Norway has also experimented in the postwar period with a tri-
partite Joint Industrial Council (advisory). This institution was created 
by the Norwegian Parliament in 1947. It is the only one of its kind in 
Scandinavia. The principal purpose of the Joint Council was to establish 
agencies in industries that could act as links between industry and the 
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goverrtment for the purpose of improving development in the industry. 
Thèse joint councils hâve been responsible for carrying out either alone 
or in co-operation with research agencies, complète économie and tech-
nical surveys which hâve been used as a base for rationalization of in-
dustry. Thèse agencies hâve been particularly busy since the création of 
EFTA and the EEC because thèse brought changes in the Norwegian 
markets and the need for industrial changes which require manpower 
planning, training, mobility, etc. 
Concluding Observations 
The Scandinavian Industrial Relations System cannot be charac-
terized as a cosy collusion between trade unions and employers, despite 
the very low incidence of strikes and the high degree of stability reached 
in the system. The conflict and the strike weapon are still présent. Neither 
can we find évidence for the possibility that infrequent use of the strike 
has produced less security of employment and a slower rate in the 
advance in the standard of living, two key objectives of the labour mo-
vement. The converse is probably true. 
According to the Scandinavians, whatever success has been achieved 
through the new approach is simply a reflection of the growing maturity 
of the participants. They would, therefore, argue that the old system of 
industrial combat was destructive, both in the sensé of contributing to 
the nation's instability, as well as being a destructive force alien to a 
maturing democracy. A simplified explanation for the dramatic changes 
that hâve taken place in thèse countries is that a large enough group of 
the élite from both sides of the market agreed to résolve industrial 
disturbances and to shift collective bargaining from the haphazard ap-
proach to one that might make a more predictable contribution both to 
the parties thereof and to the stability of the economy. Both sides hâve 
made tireless efforts through establishing new organizations and struc-
tures and by training and éducation and publicity and propaganda to 
convince a growing number of their members of the soundness of this 
approach. The efforts hâve produced quite a cohesive and disciplined 
membership. 
Essentially, the central approach to bargaining performs the rôle 
of an incomes policy and possibly more effectively than one imposed. 
It is, of course, difficult to assess how much improvement has been 
achieved between wages and salaries on the one hand and other forms 
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of incomes. It is known, however, that the trade unions hâve achieved a 
measure of success in their objective to gain greater equality of incomes 
within their own ranks. 
It has been said that the centralized system of bargaining has made 
the division of power more equal among the three groups, trade unions, 
employers and the government. This, no doubt, is true under « normal » 
conditions. Under less normal conditions, the government, even in those 
countries, has not hesitated to use its extra power when it felt the public 
interest was threatened. Moreover, under especially abnormal circums-
tances, some of thèse countries hâve had to resort to the imposition of 
priées and incomes control (currently a price freeze in Norway, price 
control in Denmark, priées and incomes control in Finland). Sweden 
has escaped, so far, having to use such powers. External factors may 
hâve partially accounted for this but it has more likely been achieved 
through rational bargaining, plus far more sophisticated manpower and 
labour market opérations than obtained in the other countries. In thèse 
respects, Sweden has currently corne closer to reaching a rational optimum 
model of an industrial relations system than in the other three countries. 
The question is often raised — How long can such a centralized 
system endure ? It is a fair question. The self-interest and group interest 
exist and are still pretty strong. Many trade unionists would prefer to 
participate directly in the wealthier enterprises rather than adhère to 
a social policy of growing equality. (Some Danish trade unions hâve 
asked for more decentralized bargaining). There is the problem of com-
munication between the top and the bottom of such large structures. 
There is the restlessness of the younger génération who hâve différent 
aspirations from the old, who are less amenable to the discipline demanded, 
and who are not at ail impressed by the old concepts of collective 
freedom and solidarity of the workers. There is the question of the 
ability of the organizations to maintain a pragmatic and flexible approach 
to new problems and the emerging dissenters. Success over the years may 
hâve bred some degree of dogmatism — an attitude the people broke 
with a long time ago. 
Whatever happens in the future, the system is an interesting one, 
worth looking at. It has an expérimental characteristic and, as such, it 
requires considérable effort to keep it from acting up. One becomes 
impressed by the attitudinal change in the basis of bargaining from one 
of enmity to one of equality ; by the near absence of the légal profession ; 
by the working out of separate agreements on a number of issues away 
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from the heat of collective bargaining ; by the on-going and increasing 
effort by both parties through their own organizations or through the 
tripartite Labour Market Boards to remove or reduce points of friction 
often caused by change, and the firm agreement between the parties 
that rational bargaining combined with effective manpower programmes 
can do much to get the economy in tune with changing external and 
internai forces and so reduce the need of government to impose measures 
that tend to exchange price stability for high unemployment. 
Does Canada hâve anything to learn from the Scandinavian model ? 
Central bargaining can only be a remote possibility in our country in 
view of the divided political jurisdiction. This does not, however, 
preclude the parties from agreeing to bargaining agents covering larger 
aggregates. Nor does it preclude employers and trade unions from having 
central confédérations for other than collective bargaining purposes. 
Some features of the Scandinavian System of industrial relations 
might be worth considering. The govemments, employers and trade 
unions could, for example, do a great deal to thaw out the continuing 
frigid industrial relations climate. This item ought to hâve the highest 
priority in Canada. Much public relations work needs to be carried out 
in order to erase the myth that the trade union is an enemy of the 
people. Full public acceptance of the trade union as a désirable institu-
tion in our democracy, not just de jure but de facto, should be a prime 
objective. It would challenge trade unions to more rational behaviour. 
We hâve much to learn from the Scandinavians in this area. 
We might explore ways and means of assisting trade unions to 
spend more on éducation and training of their members. 
Employer associations and trade union organizations ought to be 
encouraged to explore with each other the advantages of jointly working 
out spécial agreements covering matters of common interest. The purpose 
might be two-fold. Agreements might be reached on common interest 
items that do not now enter the area of interest disputes but which often 
contribute to conflict caused by lack of agreement and procédures for 
dealing with them. Secondly, an agreement also could be reached between 
the parties to reduce gradually the number of items that enter the interest 
dispute area. 
We might examine the advantages and disadvantages of establishing 
labour courts along the lines used in Scandinavia. 
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We ought to expand our experiment with on-going médiation — 
possibly as a substitute for compulsory conciliation. 
We ought to be less reluctant to use the central tripartite bodies, 
for example, in the case of the consultation programme. 
It might be useful to study the possibilities and advantages of 
establishing tripartite industrial councils along the lines obtained in 
Norway. 
LES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 
EN SCANDINAVIE 
L'importance d'un système efficace de relations industrielles est sans cesse 
croissante, dans le cas de pays qui désirent atteindre des buts de développement, de 
stabilité économique et de plein emploi. 
Les mécanismes complexes des relations industrielles sont aptes à engendrer 
aussi bien des profits accrus que des coûts élevés, imputables aux heurts possibles 
dans le processus de relations industrielles. Il est donc valable de chercher les 
causes de stabilité ou de perturbations dans différents systèmes, ainsi que d'analyser 
quelles incitations et mécanismes seraient de nature à amortir ces heurts. Notre 
étude s'intéresse particulièrement à la chaîne d'interrelations salarié-syndicat-patron-
propriétaire. 
Le climat dans lequel se déroulent ces relations est surtout influencé par les 
normes de la société telles que prônées par la population. En effet, ceux qui ont 
réussi à améliorer leur système de relations industrielles ont d'abord concentré leurs 
efforts sur la création d'un climat favorable aux relations industrielles. Ils ont fait 
des recherches sur les limites d'un système de relations industrielles, défini plus 
clairement les rôles des deux parties principales en cause. Enfin, ils ont obtenu le 
consensus en ce qui concerne l'élimination ou tout au moins la minimisation des 
éléments perturbateurs du système. Puisque l'idéologie dominante du système de 
relations industrielles d'un pays est souvent applicable dans un autre, il nous semble 
intéressant de considérer les facteurs et les mesures qui ont contribué à rendre le 
système Scandinave plus stable que le nôtre. 
Les facteurs les plus importants à l'origine de cette stabilité sont les suivants : 
les deux parties en cause s'entendent afin d'abolir toutes causes futiles de mésentente 
et de respecter la position prise par l'autre partie. La décision finale est laissée à 
l'autorité centrale qui contrôle les points non établis dans la législation et négocie 
quant à la somme totale de profits qui doivent revenir aux travailleurs. Dès le début, 
dans les accords de base, on a convenu du déroulement pacifique des négociations. 
On s'entend au départ sur une politique de plein emploi, ce qui influence le com-
portement du gouvernement des deux parties en cause. Enfin, le facteur proba-
blement le plus important est l'importance donnée à la formation pour les deux 
groupes appelés à négocier. Certains attribuent la stabilité du système de relations 
LES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES EN SCANDINAVIE 225 
industrielles au fait que ce sont des partis travaillistes qui sont au pouvoir ; il ne 
faut pas surestimer ce phénomène, car le gouvernement doit toujours conserver 
l'appui des deux groupes (syndicats-employés et patrons-propriétaires). Comme dans 
la plupart des pays occidentaux, sauf l'Allemagne, les syndicats sont organisés selon 
le métier ou l'industrie, ces différents syndicats étant réunis au sommet en un 
organisme central. Ces organismes centraux sont l'organisation centrale des syndicats 
et la Confédération des employeurs qui sont les agents négociateurs pour tous les 
travailleurs et les patrons affiliés à ces organisations ; ayant pris connaissance des 
demandes venant des échelons inférieurs et spécialisés des organisations syndicales, 
ils en discutent dans l'optique d'éviter la grève, de conserver le plein emploi, la 
stabilité des prix, etc. Au cours des négociations on en arrive à cerner le cadre 
économique, c'est-à-dire les hausses de salaires que peut permettre l'économie sans 
mettre en danger la stabilité des prix, parfois on mettra l'accent sur les salaires, 
d'autres fois sur les avantages sociaux, ou sur les droits des plus bas-salariés. Fait à 
remarquer, lorsque les négociations portent sur des points autres que celui des 
salaires, les pourparlers ont tendance à être très longs afin de retarder la grève. 
Le rôle joué par le gouvernement au sein de ce système s'exécute via deux 
organismes : le Service de médiation et le Tribunal du travail. Ce dernier juge les 
griefs alors que le Service de médiation assiste les parties à conclure une entente 
sans recourir à la grève. Nous devons noter ici que le recours à toute sanction 
économique est suspendu pendant la durée de la convention collective. 
Le Tribunal du travail, qui doit veiller à faire respecter les lois sur le travail 
ainsi que les droits de tous, est un organisme tripartite où siègent des représentants 
du gouvernement, de l'organisation centrale du syndicalisme et de la Confédération 
des employeurs. Le Service de médiation, constitué d'un médiateur du palier supérieur 
du gouvernement et de plusieurs médiateurs régionaux, non seulement tente de 
régler les crises, mais aussi cherche à les prévoir et les éviter ; aucune grève ne 
peut être déclenchée sans que cet organisme en ait été avisé préalablement. 
Des commissions consultatives mixtes, formées de membres nommés par les 
organismes syndicaux et les organismes patronaux ont donné des résultats valables 
en faisant des études techniques et économiques qui ont été le point de départ 
de la planification de l'industrie. 
CONCLUSION 
On ne peut qualifier le régime de relations du travail en Scandinavie comme 
étant une collusion entre syndicats et employeurs. Le conflit et la grève y sont 
toujours présents. Ce succès relatif est dû en grande partie aux efforts conjoints 
des deux parties d'établir de nouvelles organisations, de nouvelles structures et 
d'éduquer leurs membres par une approche plus prévisionnelle de la négociation 
collective, approche qui joue essentiellement le rôle d'une politique des revenus. 
On peut également dire que, de façon normale, le système centralisé de négo-
ciation a rendu plus égale la répartition du pouvoir entre les trois groupes en 
présence. Lors de circonstances extraordinaires, les gouvernements n'ont pas hésité 
à se servir de leurs pouvoirs, surtout lorsque l'intérêt public était menacé. 
